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Representing and Performing Businesses  
A Segmentation Model in Action 
KAREN BOLL 
 
ABSTRACT This article investigates a segmentation model used by the Danish Tax and Customs 
Administration to classify businesses’ motivational postures. The article uses two different 
conceptualizations of performativity to analyze what the model’s segmentations do; Hacking’s 
idea of making up people and MacKenzie’s idea of performativity. Based on these two approaches 
I demonstrate that the segmentation model represents and performs the businesses as it ‘makes up’ 
certain new ways to be a business and as the businesses can be seen as ‘moving targets’. With 
inspiration from MacKenzie my following argument is that the segmentation model posits a 
remarkable cleverness in that it simultaneously alters what it represents and represents this 
altered reality to confirm the accuracy of its own model of the businesses’ postures. However, 
despite this cleverness the model bears a blind spot as it assumes a world wherein everything 
around the model is in motion and can be shaped, whereas it believes itself to be stable. As 
indicated in the article, this assumption turns out problematic as the tax administration questions 
the model’s ability to produce valid comparisons. All in all, the article provides a detailed 
description and analysis of the model’s performativity and provides an example of a 
performativity study which in its methodology differs from the methodological criteria set up by 
MacKenzie. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Within the last decade tax administrations in several countries have implemented 
segmentation models (SKAT, 2009c, OECD, 2004, Braithwaite, 2003a). A segmentation 
model divides taxpayers into categories according to the taxpayers’ ‘motivational 
postures’ and provides treatments accordingly. A taxpayer who is seen as willing and able 
to comply receives mostly service, while a taxpayer who is seen as opponent and 
unwilling to comply more often receives inspections and audits (Braithwaite, J. 2002, 
Braithwaite, 2003c). A key feature of segmentation models is that they both represent the 
taxpayers based on their postures and they seek to change the taxpayers by recommending 
different treatments. The aim of the model’s targeted treatments is to move taxpayers 
towards more compliant postures. In Denmark such a segmentation model was 
implemented in 2005 as part of the Danish Tax and Customs Administration’s (SKAT) 
change in strategy where greater emphasis was put on servicing and guiding the taxpayers, 
2 
 
 
instead of enforcing compliance by deterring. This regulation paradigm is also termed 
‘responsive regulation’ as it is responsive to the motivational postures of the taxpayers.   
 
In science and technology studies (STS) representations of reality are also often coupled to 
interventions in that reality. This is often referred to as representations being 
‘performative’. Since the mid 1990s a growing body of literature within STS has analyzed 
different performative effects of representations (e.g. Barad, 2003, Bowker and Star, 1999, 
Callon, 1998, Hacking, 2006, Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007, MacKenzie, 2006, Pickering, 
1995,). These studies argue that science, classification systems and (economic) models, 
respectively, do not only represent, but also perform what they purport simply to refer to. 
Two notable contributions within this line of research are Ian Hacking and Donald 
MacKenzie. Hacking known for his work on how classifications make up ‘certain people’ 
(Hacking, 2006, 2007) and MacKenzie known for his work on how economic models 
shape the economy (MacKenzie, 2006, 2007, MacKenzie et al., 2007).       
 
This article focuses on an analysis of the relationship between the segmentation model 
implemented in the Danish Tax and Customs Administration (SKAT) and the businesses 
represented and performed by the model. In the article I use Hacking’s and MacKenzie’s 
concepts of performativity as an analytical framework to analyse the model. I first 
introduce the segmentation model, its assumptions and why it was implemented in 
Denmark. I then introduce the concepts of performativity, emphasizing different analytical 
strategies for investigation. In the third section I introduce the empirical material which 
the article draws on and some methodological challenges in studying performativity. In 
the fourth section, I show that the segmentation model in various ways changes the 
businesses which it depicts and that the model itself in due course is changed. I show that 
the segmentation model posits a cleverness in that it simultaneously alters what it 
represents and represents this altered reality to confirm the accuracy of its own model of 
the taxpayers’ postures. But also, that the model has a blind spot in that it assumes a world 
wherein everything around the model is in motion and can be shaped, whereas it believes 
itself to be stable. I point out how this assumption has been fatal for the model. 
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The segmentation model 
 
In 2005 SKAT implemented a new business scheme called the ‘treatment strategy’ which 
is closely linked to the implementation of the segmentation model. In accordance with this 
strategy the tax authority began advocating (and demanding) new ways of working for the 
employees. This entailed that the tax inspectors should be more ‘responsive’ to the 
taxpayers and a service-minded attitude was advocated alongside the traditional 
deterrence-based approach. According to the bureaucrats in the tax administration the 
segmentation model could be used to develop a more sensitive understanding of the 
motivational postures of the taxpayers  
The Danish Compliance Strategy
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Illustration I: The Danish segmentation model.  
The segmentation model shows how taxpayers are divided into two broad categories; 
opponents and partners, which represent the basic motivational postures of taxpayers. 
Motivational postures refer to the interconnected sets of beliefs and attitudes in relation to 
tax that a taxpayer openly shares with others (Braithwaite, 2003a, p. 18). The opponents 
are characterized by being: “Determined not to comply” or “Unwilling to comply, but can 
be influenced”. The partners are viewed as fundamentally more cooperative. They are 
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“Willing to comply, but does not always succeed” or they are “Willing and able to 
comply”. In the model these motivational postures are coupled with corresponding 
treatment strategies of “Audits and investigation” and “Raised stakes” for the opponents 
and “Targeted and timely information and guidance” for the partners. SKAT writes: 
The basic idea of the [treatment] strategy is that the treatment of the 
taxpayers needs to be differentiated and adjusted. This in accordance 
with whom we are dealing with and to the correct balance between – on 
the one hand – information, guidance and support to conduct 
declaration and payment procedures – and on the other hand – control. 
(SKAT, 2007c, p. 7)      
What is central of the model is that it has a nature of both representing and performing the 
taxpayers: It contains a representational claim as the model shows the segments of 
taxpayers and  there are different kinds of treatments (audits and investigation, raised 
stakes, etc.) that will be activated to change, that is, perform the taxpayers. Because of the 
close link between a given motivational posture of a taxpayer and a corresponding 
treatment the approach can be described as an individualized approach to enforcement. 
The judgment of the taxpayer is based on his/her morals, values, ethics, etc.  Tuck (2011) 
and Boll (2011) both provide detailed analyses of how tax inspectors navigate in doing 
responsive regulation and which dilemmas arises in doing this. 
 
Assumptions in the segmentation model  
Originally, the segmentation model was created by the Australian Tax Office which 
implemented it in 1998 as part of their transition from deterrence-based to responsive-
based regulation. As in Denmark, the model’s function in Australia was to facilitate an 
understanding of the taxpayers’ motivational postures and to respond accordingly. The 
Australian Tax Office developed the model in cooperation with the regulatory researchers 
Valery and John Braithwaite, who both have disciplinary backgrounds in psychology. The 
segmentation model was later taken up by the OECD who described it as a tool to 
recognize the “spectrum of taxpayer attitudes to compliance” (OECD, 2004, p. 41). It was 
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after the OECD’s promotion of the segmentation model that the model was implemented 
in SKAT: 
Australia and New Zealand have experimented with new approaches to 
taxpayers, and this approach has been adopted by the OECD. This 
approach is now common in many of the countries which we normally 
compare ourselves to. We think we too can gain a lot by adopting this 
approach. (SKAT, 2009c) 
From the model’s provenance in the Braithwaites’ research it is based on a number of 
assumptions which also apply to its use in Denmark. In relation to the quantitative 
segmentations the explicit assumption underlying the model is that: ”most of the 
population is assumed to be located at the base of the pyramid” (Braithwaite, 2003b, p. 5). 
This assumption was based on a survey conducted by Valery Braithwaite which depicted 
Australian taxpayers’ motivational postures. The survey was a self-report questionnaire 
wherein 2040 respondents were asked to state their view on various statements concerning 
tax: “Approximately 92 per cent of respondents relate positively to the posture of 
commitment [what in Denmark is called ‘partners’] and 73 per cent recognize themselves 
in the posture of capitulation [i.e. willing to comply]” (2003a, p. 23). Only 7 per cent of 
respondents described themselves as direct opponents (2003a, p. 23). Based on this survey 
the basic proportions of the segments were established and it was demonstrated that most 
taxpayers were in fact partners.  
 
The segmentation model also assumes that taxpayers are neither driven by economic 
interests, nor do they primarily respond to deterrence; instead most taxpayers respond 
primarily to service and guidance. The model hereby illustrates that the “‘one size fits all’ 
conception of threats and punishment…is poorly suited to the empirical realities of the 
matter” (Job and Honaker, 2003, p. 113). Thus, working with the model requires that the 
regulators assume that multiple factors influence taxpayers’ decisions to comply. 
 
Finally, an assumption about the segmentation model is that it is cost-effective. This is due 
to the fact that the taxpayers at the bottom of the pyramid are assumed to be self-
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regulating. Resources can therefore be directed to effectuating expensive audits at the top 
of the pyramid.The assumption about cost-effectiveness was one of the primary reasons 
for the model’s implementation in Denmark. From 2005 and onwards SKAT was exposed 
to a severe reduction in terms of manpower: From approximately 12,000 employees in 
2005 to approximately 6,800 in 2012. Danish politicians demanded an increased 
efficiency in spite of this decrease in employees. This ought to be feasible, they claimed, 
due to increasing digitalization of the tax administration and more effective prioritization 
of resources. The segmentation model was seen as holding the promise of such efficiency 
improvement.  
 
In the years after the implementation of the segmentation model major changes occurred 
in the working practices in SKAT: Inspectors were instructed to provide more service; 
annual procedures of going systematically through (all) businesses’ accounts were 
replaced by doing risk analysis; and costly inspections such as audits were targeted the 
opponent-segment. These internal organizational changes in working practices, are not the 
primary focus here. Instead, focus of this article is on the segmentation model’s 
relationship to the businesses whom it claims to represent and whom it aims to change. To 
be able to conceptualize this relationship between representation and what is represented 
the next section introduces different ideas about performativity.  
 
 
Concepts of performativity 
 
’Performative’ and ’performativity’ are currently among the most 
widely deployed concepts in the social sciences and humanities. (du 
Gay, 2010,  p. 171) 
Social scientists often talk about performativity. They refer to a “post humanist 
performativity” (Barad, 2003), “performativity of economics” (Callon, 2010, MacKenzie 
et al., 2007), a “performative program” (Callon, 2010), a “performative idiom” (Pickering, 
1994, 1995) or they might talk about “theorists of performativity” (Butler, 2010). In 
describing what performativity is all about Butler writes: 
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I am aware, for instance, within the social sciences more generally, that 
performativity has become a way to think about ‘effects’, in particular, 
to supply an alternative to causal frameworks for thinking about effects. 
(2010, p. 147) 
Most STS-researchers would probably agree with Butler’s characterization that 
performativity connects to endeavors of thinking about ‘effects’. This agreement includes 
Hacking’s and MacKenzie’s views on performativity. Both of them share the ambition of 
analyzing what is the relation between our knowledge and the world and they focus on 
questioning how representations have effects on what they represent. That is, how they are 
performative. MacKenzie operates within the broader field of Social Studies of Finance. 
In this line of research several other central studies focus on how different models or 
market mechanisms are performative (Callon 1998, 2007, Callon et al., 2007, Callon & 
Muniesa, 2005, Cochoy et al., 2010, Garcia-Parpet, 2007, Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007, 
Knorr-Cetina & Preda, 2005). Also, there is a wider literature on the relationships between 
different representations (classifications, sciences, models, numbers, sexes, etc.) and 
‘reality’ (Bowker & Star, 1999, Butler, 1993, Egmond & Zeizz, 2010, Espeland & Sauder, 
2007, Giraudeau, 2010,  Latour, 1987, 1999, Mcfall, 2010, Porter, 1995, Pickering, 1995). 
The reason why Hacking and MacKenzie are highlighted in this article rather than these 
other resources is because of their elaborated descriptions of how to conceptualize 
representation and performativity.  
 
Under the headline of Making up People Hacking has argued that classifications make up 
people, as “‘kinds of people’ would not have existed, as a kind of people, until they had 
been classified, organized and taxed” (Hacking, 2007, p. 288). Hacking has developed 
what he calls a ‘five-part framework’ for analyzing the relationship between 
classifications and the classified (Hacking, 2006, 2007). In this framework he focuses 
upon: (a) – a classification whereby something is classified; (b) – the people, i.e. the 
individuals that fit into the various classifications; (c) – the institutions, for instance, tax 
collectors who work within bureaucratic structures; (d) – knowledge of the kinds of people 
classified; and (e) experts who generate or legitimate the detailed knowledge (2007, p. 
296ff). According to Hacking, these five elements interact and in this interaction it 
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becomes apparent that what we might think of as given entities defined by definite 
properties are “moving targets” because they change as they interact with our 
classifications (Hacking, 2007, p. 293) In relation to ‘making up people’ and seeing them 
as ‘moving targets’ Hacking also introduces another concept: ‘engines of discovery’. 
According to Hacking, engines of discovery are mechanisms such as counting, 
quantifying, correlating, bureaucratizing and so forth. These engines are designed for 
discovery and for producing knowledge of the subject in question (Hacking 2006, p. 24, 
2007, p. 305ff). 
 
MacKenzie also analyses performativity. Looking at financial models, MacKenzie claims 
that economic models do things, rather than simply picturing an external reality 
(MacKenzie 2006, 2009, MacKenzie et al., 2007). MacKenzie’s argument is that models 
are engines capable of performing the economy, not only cameras representing the 
economy. To characterize different degrees of performativity MacKenzie works with what 
he calls a ‘possible classification’ of performativity. First, MacKenzie describes generic 
performativity which is the “weakest” form of performativity and which builds on the idea 
that: “An aspect of economics (…) is used by participants in economic processes, 
regulators etc.” (2006, p. 17). Second, MacKenzie writes about effective performativity 
which implies a “stronger” meaning of performativity  as the “practical use of an aspect of 
economics has an effect on economic processes” (2006, p. 17). The third and “strongest” 
kind of performativity is divided into Barnesian performativity and counterperformativity 
(2006, p. 18-19). Barnesian performativity refers to a situation where “aspect[s] of 
economics alter economic processes so that they are more like their depiction by 
economics” (2007, p. 77). Counterperformativity is the opposite where the “effect of the 
practical use of a theory or model may be to alter economic processes so that they 
conform less well to the theory or model” (2006, p. 19).  
 
I use Hacking’s and MacKenzie’s approaches to analyze the segmentation model because 
this can help me bring out what the model does. If we look at the segmentation model 
without any theoretical lense the model seems remarkable ‘innocent’; it is but a model that 
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depicts the postures of the taxpayers and which prescribes treatments to enhance their tax 
compliance. However, Hacking and MacKenzie teach us that no model is innocent. 
 
 
The empirical material 
 
Hacking and MacKenzie agree that a difficulty is empirically to determine what effect, if 
any, the use of economics or classifications have on the economic process or the kinds of 
people in question. The problem lies in analyzing the relationship between a thing in the 
world and its representations and how they perform each other – if they do so. This is a 
problem as typically there are no univocal cause-effect relationships between the two and 
as the thing in the world can be distant from (or even unknown to) its representations. 
Particularly MacKenzie writes about these methodological difficulties in studying 
performativity: “the extent of the ‘fit’ between a theoretical model and pattern of prices 
cannot be determined by simple inspection” (2006, p. 24-25). He states that performativity 
should be studied over time or “Ideally, one would like to be able directly to compare 
processes with and without use of the aspect of economics in question” (2006, p. 18).  
 
These methodological criteria are interesting to consider in relation to my endeavor of 
investigating the relationship between the segmentation model and the businesses as I 
cannot at first approximation ‘live up’ to these criteria. It has been impossible to follow 
MacKenzie’s suggestion to study the model over a longer time span as the model was first 
implemented in 2005 and as a Compliance-project which accomplished the segmentations 
was not initiated until 2007. Compared to MacKenzie’s study which covers several 
decades this relatively short time span (from 2007 until 2010) might be seen as a 
hindrance for investigating the relationship between the model and the businesses. Also, 
my study cannot live up to MacKenzie’s ideal of comparing a situation with and without 
the use of a model, as the segmentation model has been implemented in all of SKAT’s 
organization.  
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Despite not being able to live up to MacKenzie’s methodological criteria the empirical 
material which forms the basis of the analysis does provide data about the relationship 
between the model and the businesses. I draw on three kinds of empirical material: 
explorative interviews, official documents, and scholarly literature. I interviewed the 
owners or bookkeepers of 12 businesses and the external consultants of six of these, 
totaling 18 interviews. The interviewed businesses were selected on the criteria that they 
were small and midsized and were segmented to be in the white bottom segment. 
Regarding the official documents the article relies on written material from SKAT 
describing the model; references are given to SKAT’s own reports, PowerPoint slides and 
statistics on the segmentation model. Finally, I draw on scholarly literature on the 
segmentation model which refers to Valery and John Braithwaite’s descriptions of the 
model.  
 
There is no doubt that the segmentation model and the businesses which I describe in this 
article are potentially far away from each other; the model being a strategy and an 
intension about responsive regulation that exists in SKAT, while the businesses are 
entities spread all over the country. However, I believe that the empirical material 
thematizes their relationship due to the various statements from the interviewees and due 
to the various official documents which SKAT has produced to account for this selfsame 
relation.  
 
 
The segmentation model as a camera and an engine 
 
The presentation of the segmentation model at the beginning of the article is already a step 
into a Hacking-analysis of the performativity of the model. I have described the 
classifications whereby the taxpayers are categorized. We do not yet know much about the 
people who fit into the segments – but this will be elaborated shortly. We know something 
about the institution, SKAT, which has implemented the model and why it has done so. 
We also know a little about the knowledge of the kinds of people segmented. Here, for 
instance, Valery Braithwaite has provided knowledge of the taxpayers through the self-
report questionnaire. Lastly, I have also introduced the experts (the Braithwaites and the 
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OECD) who generate and legitimate the model. Following Hacking’s approach and being 
interested in grasping what the segmentation model actually does in relation to the 
businesses it represents, the reader needs to know more about the ‘engines of discovery’ in 
SKAT which create knowledge of the businesses. Consequently, the next section presents 
empirical material that illustrates how the segmentation model depicts the postures of the 
businesses in a Compliance-project and in an automatic segmentation of businesses.  
 
Though implemented in 2005, it was not until 2007 that SKAT initiated the Compliance-
project which provided the quantitative segmentations of the taxpayers. To accomplish 
this quantitative segmentation, the Compliance-project conducted inspections of 22,000 
randomly selected businesses and individual Danish taxpayers. The aim of the project was 
to measure the level of tax compliance in selected businesses in relation to different 
parameters (sector, age, income, sex, geography etc.). Basically, the idea of the 
Compliance-project was that at each random inspection the participating tax inspectors 
should rate the inspected taxpayer’s motivational posture. Hence, whereas Valery 
Braithwaite in Australia conducted a national survey to see the spread of the taxpayers as 
these self-reported their postures by answering questions, SKAT embarked on a strategy 
of letting the tax inspectors rate the motivations.  
 
Illustration II: Process diagram for rating motivational postures (SKAT, 2009b).  
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In doing these ratings the tax inspectors were equipped with the above process diagram. 
Their rating is described by SKAT in the following way:  
When a case worker has completed a case, he or she must assess the 
degree to which the regulations have been complied with … This is a 
newly established method of grading on a scale from 0 to 6 [from red to 
white]… Actual placement on the scale is made primarily according to 
objective criteria. (SKAT, 2009b, p. 12) 
Thus, evaluating each random inspection the inspectors first needed to judge whether the 
inspection resulted in ‘an adjustment to the taxable amount’. If yes, the inspectors had to 
judge whether the adjustments were assessed as being the result of deliberate falsification. 
The inspector then had to judge whether it was a ‘prosecutable offence’ etc. (see diagram). 
It was also stated by the report from SKAT that the tax inspectors had to judge whether 
the “errors are mainly the result of misunderstanding or ignorance of the rules – i.e. are 
connected with a high level of willingness to comply“. Or “If on the other hand the errors 
come from a deliberate attempt to cheat – i.e. are connected with low levels of willingness 
to comply” (SKAT, 2009b, p. 13). How this judgment can amount to a rating based on 
‘objective criteria’ – as stated in the citation above – is not evident.  
 
Looking at the results of the inspections the outcome of this exercise was that 53.3 per 
cent of the businesses were judged to be in the bottom white segment. Scaled up to apply 
to all businesses in Denmark this corresponded to approximately 300,000 businesses. 39.3 
per cent (scaled up to approximately 238,000 businesses) were estimated to be in the green 
segment. 7.2 per cent (scaled up to approximately 83,000 businesses) were estimated to be 
in the yellow segment. And finally 0.2 per cent (somewhere between 300 and 500 
businesses) were estimated to be in the upper red segment (SKAT, 2009a, p. 19). Based on 
these segments the report on the businesses concludes: 
The underlying distribution showed that fully 93% of all businesses 
could be viewed as co-players, while only 7% had to be regarded as 
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opponents. A very large majority of businesses thus aims to follow the 
rules. (SKAT, 2009b, p. 1) 
 
As the Compliance-project focused on creating an overall picture of the motivational 
postures of Danish businesses, an additional initiative of doing automatic segmentations 
was started to know more about the postures of each individual business. Hence, SKAT 
also started doing segmentations of businesses based on an automatically assessment of 
these: “To differentiate the treatment it is necessary that SKAT has a picture of who are 
partners and who are opponents. This happens by way of a segmentation based on a 
number of objective criteria” (SKAT, 2007c, p. 7). These criteria amounted to 29 criteria 
and concerned, for instance; whether a business had been ‘issued an enforcement notice’, 
if so, the business was automatically segmented as green; or whether a business had been 
‘issued an enforcement notice of filling out a log-book’, if so, the business was 
automatically segmented as yellow (SKAT, 2007c). Comparing the segmentation based on 
the inspectors’ ratings in the Compliance-project and the automatic segmentation the 
results showed (luckily) a similar spread of the taxpayers into the segments (compare 
SKAT, 2007c to SKAT, 2009b). As the information in SKAT’s IT-systems allowed all 
kinds of correlations the main report on the automatic segmentation reported on how the 
segments spread across the regions of Denmark (SKAT, 2007c). Based on this automatic 
segmentation it was possible to construct maps showing compliance. The map below 
shows that compliance-rates are highest and thereby most compliant in the darker area of 
western Jutland and least compliant in the lightest area around Copenhagen.   
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Illustration III: National compliance map. The rating 0 indicates serious mistakes, while 
the rating 6 means perfect tax compliance. (SKAT, 2007c, p. 42) 
The Compliance-project and the automatic segmentation show how SKAT has produced 
evidence based knowledge of the taxpayers’ motivations and content to the segmentation 
model. Whereas tax inspectors might earlier have had informal or experienced-based 
knowledge of the businesses’ postures, now extensive ‘objective’ knowledge had been 
produced. These results have been presented and used internally in SKAT, but SKAT has 
also presented the findings in several international forums. Below is a PowerPoint slide 
from a presentation in Vancouver, Canada, 2009. Here two tax employees from the main 
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office of SKAT presented the Danish strategy at an OECD arranged conference on tax 
compliance. The slide illustrates that SKAT not only had the segmentation model as a 
vision, it had also filled out the model with its own representations of the Danish 
businesses.   
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Illustration IV: Compliance strategy Businesses. Vancouver, Canada, May 2009. 
It is possible to characterize the above as an illustration of what Hacking calls ‘engines of 
discovery’. SKAT has counted, quantified and correlated the taxpayers; SKAT has 
produced knowledge of the businesses and made a representation of these by the 
percentages of businesses divided into each segment. Obviously, the segmentation model 
has classified the businesses with the intention of controlling, helping and changing them. 
The Compliance-project and the automatic segmentation thus function as a ‘camera’ that 
has depicted the reality of the businesses. Hacking states that such classifications are not 
merely representations; they also make up people. As stated earlier he claims that “‘kinds 
of people’ would not have existed, as a kind of people, until they had been classified, 
organized and taxed” (2007, p. 288). If we look at the segmented businesses and follow 
Hacking’s reasoning, it is relevant to ask how we may perceive the segmented businesses 
as being ‘made up’ as effects of being classified. How does the model create kinds of 
businesses that ‘in a certain sense did not exist before’?   
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Making up new businesses 
In an interview I was asking Torben, an accountant at a large Copenhagen based 
accountancy firm, about his knowledge of the segmentation model and SKAT’s new 
treatment strategy. He explained that he knew the model and:  
I really think that it is quite right that SKAT has tried to divide them 
[the businesses]. It has been a pleasure to experience that segmentation 
of the taxpayers. You know, in the past we felt that inspectors from 
SKAT came and just placed themselves in the businesses to do audits, 
and they did it in businesses which we believed were running after the 
books. Now, these businesses have been left out of focus ... You know, 
instead of SKAT shooting broad with a shotgun. Then today, SKAT is 
shooting with a saloon rifle with a rifle telescope. (Interview S: 17-21) 
Another accountant, Erling, who had a one-man accountancy firm in the countryside, 
explained that he found that SKAT had become very invisible within the past few years. 
He stated that this was probably due to the whole re-structuring of the tax administration:  
They [SKAT] are not very visible at all. I mean, they are visible on the 
internet and places like that. But, you never see them face-to-face ... I 
haven’t had a visit for 3-4 years. I haven’t received a request about 
anything. You know, where they ask for something. It is a very, very 
long time since I have heard from them. (Interview Q: 8-9) 
The accountant, Torben, furthermore described what he experienced as a different kind of 
tax inspector:  
10 years ago, I think you've experienced that you sent something to 
SKAT without getting answers...But that has only been the case once in 
the last 5 years...I can feel that SKAT has changed, at least in relation to 
many of the young people I know at SKAT. It is another type of 
employee you meet. They really would like to help the businesses. 
What I hear back from the businesses’ accounting department is also, 
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that they encounter a different attitude from the inspectors. They like to 
assist to the extent they can. (Interview S: 4-5) 
That the tax inspectors express different attitudes was a recurrent theme in the interviews. 
For instance, a business owner in a small design company also explained that he felt that 
SKAT was more tolerant and service-minded towards taxpayers who tried to do their best, 
even though they made mistakes (Interview C: 1). In relation to an earlier visit from 
SKAT he explained that the tax inspector had told him:  
Now you have explained to me how your routines are, that is fine, but 
you just have to have the mistakes corrected. We’ll not do anything 
more about it now. But if we come here on the next inspection and find 
that the same mistakes are here, then it is not good. (Interview C: 8) 
The owner commented: “I think that is fine and fair talk. That is the way things should be 
solved. We had some lapses but all in all, the inspector sensed that things were fine and 
then there was no catastrophe.” (Interview C: 8) 
 
These quotes make clear that the interviewees perceive a different attitude emerging from 
the tax inspectors. The inspectors are generally perceived as more service-minded and 
helpful; the businesses experience fewer inspections; they feel that SKAT does not often 
call back for more information; and they experience more ‘fair talk’. One emphasized that 
SKAT appeared invisible. This, most likely, is an indication that the accountant and his 
businesses are segmented as partners and therefore do not receive unnecessary 
inspections. In relation to these changes the point is that many of these changes (if not all) 
can be connected to the implementation of the segmentation model and the treatment 
strategy. What they do is exactly to emphasize differentiated and targeted treatments 
where, indeed, the compliant taxpayers should perceive that they receive more service and 
guidance.   
 
I read these statements as indicating that the segmentation model has participated in 
constructing a new way to be a business. For instance, in 1995 being in the ‘white’ 
segment was not ‘a way to be a business’; a business could not experience itself as such 
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with service and trust, and they could not interact with its accountant as such. But in 2010 
being a ‘white’ business is ‘a way to be a business’ (see inspiration: Hacking, 2006, p. 23). 
Understood in this way, the segmentation model has indeed had the effect of creating 
businesses that ‘in a certain sense did not exist before’. Hacking states that we tend to 
think in the first place of “these kinds of people as definite classes defined by definite 
properties” (2006, p. 23). Drawing an analogy to the businesses we might think of the 
segmented businesses as having definite properties But as Hacking states, these ‘kinds of 
people’ do in fact not have definite properties. On the contrary, Hacking argues that they 
are “moving targets because our investigations interacts with them, and change them” 
(2006, p. 23). My interest in this latter claim from Hacking is to investigate in what ways 
the segmented businesses can be understood as ‘moving targets’. 
 
Moving targets or ignorant targets?   
The accountant Bent stated that he had a ‘good feeling’ of the segmentation model, 
however:  
People both use and misuse the segmentations. You know, we stay here, 
we place ourselves in one segment and then we stay there. And that is 
with ‘God’s peace’, we stay in place ... People very quickly figure out 
that there is a segmentation, and then we try to adapt to it. You report 
on time and pay as you are supposed to. So, the surface is noble ... The 
idea that we can be in hideout and not make too much fuss about 
ourselves. That is something we remember. (Interview R: 7-8)       
Concerning the same matter the accountant Tora stated:  
I’ve heard that SKAT divides businesses according to how good or bad 
they are in relation to doing their accounts. I’ve heard about colors, but, 
how SKAT does it, that I do not know anything about. But as I 
understand it, it is some kind of ‘stamp of approval’ and these 
businesses are not so often selected for inspection. (Interview O: 4) 
Asbjørn, also accountant, reported the following on the segmentation:  
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I know those four color codes, and that they [SKAT] use them to divide 
the businesses ... However, the basic criteria for when you are put into 
one category instead of another, that I do not know. It is only on a more 
overall level that I kind of know whether a business is a partner or an 
opponent ... And, SKAT has not provided any information about this. 
(Interview N: 3-4) 
Furthermore, he commented that SKAT’s segmentation model has the effect that only 
certain targeted segments are inspected. When the businesses which he advices experience 
that they are not being exposed to inspection, they still do not try to cheat: “It is not my 
perception that these businesses say; ‘alright, there is no inspection here, then we might 
just as well try to cheat’” (Interview N: 9). A business owner in a small design company 
had been informed about the segmentations from his accountant and explained:  
I have been told that in relation to SKAT you receive grades. Like, they 
say, this business is normally OK, and to other they might say that they 
are charlatans. And generally, in those businesses where it is normally 
OK, these businesses are pretty preserved from inspection. (Interview 
C: 7) 
The accountant Torben further commented on SKAT’s 29 segmentation criteria: “I do not 
have any knowledge of the precise objective segmentation criteria. And I do not believe 
that the businesses speculate in [complying with] them” (Interview S: 11). Speculate here 
carrying the meaning of speculating as to whether the segmentations can be used to their 
advantage. 
 
The quotes indicate a number of interesting and contradictory things. First of all, they 
indicate that some of the businesses do indeed speculate in the segmentation model with 
the purpose of using it to their advantage. They see it as positive to avoid inspection and 
they try to place themselves in hideouts, try to preserve themselves from inspections, or 
they try to get stamps of approval whereby they are out of sight of SKAT. One accountant 
even indicates that living up to the segmentation criteria is a way of having a ‘noble 
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surface’, implicitly saying that things can happen underneath this surface. These 
statements speak in favor of the claim that the businesses are ‘moving targets’; the 
businesses gain knowledge of the segmentation model, though scarce in some instances, it 
is enough to make (some of them) direct their practices so that they live up to the 
segmentation criteria and become more compliant (unless things are happening 
underneath the ‘noble’ surface). In this way the quotes illustrate that some of the 
businesses change their practices and ways of being a business as they interact with the 
segmentation model. The model has the built-in motivation that if the businesses mould 
their practices to demonstrate tax compliance then they will experience fewer inspections. 
On the other hand, however, is the point that not all of the businesses seem to change their 
practices. This is either because they simply do not speculate in the model, or because they 
do not know the segmentation criteria and therefore quite evidently cannot speculate in 
them. Hence, several of the accountants and business owners are not aware of the specific 
segmentation criteria as they have not been communicated by SKAT. This indicates that 
not all of the businesses can be characterized as ‘moving targets’. Instead, they might 
better be characterized as ‘ignorant targets’ because they are not aware of, nor influenced 
by SKAT’s ‘segmentation-engine’. 
 
To demonstrate that the segmentation model and the treatment strategy in general have 
indeed had effects on the relationship between SKAT and the businesses one can also turn 
to SKAT’s own evidence of these effects as SKAT monitors the effects of its own strategy 
and appearance. Every second year SKAT effectuates large scale surveys of Danish 
businesses’ attitudes to SKAT. In the survey conducted in 2009 SKAT concludes that:  
27 per cent of the businesses which have received a visit from SKAT 
have assessed the visit to be a ‘service visit’. I 2007 this percentage was 
19. This result is in line with SKAT’s strategy concerning giving 
guidance and service before inspection. (SKAT, 2010, p. 1)       
Hence, SKAT itself has identified (small) positive effects of its strategy of “primarily 
doing guidance-visits as opposed to inspection-visits” (SKAT, 2010, p. 8). This too 
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indicates that a ‘new way to be a business’ is under way; more businesses are perceiving 
themselves as being in a category of businesses receiving ‘service visits’. 
 
 
Making the segmentation model truer  
 
So far the analysis has referred to Hacking’s approach to studying effects. However, many 
of the insights presented also fit with MacKenzie’s approach. Recalling that MacKenzie 
talks about generic performativity, effective performativity, Barnesian performativity and 
counterperformativity. With reference to these concepts I can claim, first of all, that the 
presented empirical material indicates that the segmentation model has been performative 
in the first generic sense; the model has clearly been used by SKAT. Second, the material 
also indicates that effective performativity has been at play as the use of the model has had 
effects; new tax inspectors have come about and the businesses experience themselves in 
new ways. Thirdly, MacKenzie talks about Barnesian performativity and 
counterperformativity. These forms of performativity will be in focus in the following.  
 
I will argue that the mechanisms of Barnesian performativity are indeed at play in the 
presented material. In both Valery Braithwaite’s survey of the Australians’ self-reported 
motivational postures, in SKAT’s Compliance-project, and in the automatic segmentation 
a certain model of the taxpayers’ motivational postures is presented. It is a model that 
depicts that most taxpayers are placed in the bottom white segment of the pyramid and 
which indicates that these taxpayers have a cooperative posture. What is interesting about 
this model of the taxpayers’ postures is the segmentation model’s barefaced aim directly 
to produce this reality. This is done by presenting treatments (audits and investigation, 
raised stakes and targeted and timely information and guidance) which produce this state 
of affairs. Hence, these treatments make the businesses try to place themselves in the 
bottom of the pyramid. This then confirms the truthfulness of the segmentation model’s 
assumption that most taxpayers are indeed in the white bottom segment. However, this is 
not in any way the natural state of affairs of the businesses; it is an effect of the use of the 
model. What the segmentation model does is thus simultaneously to alter what it 
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represents and to represent this altered reality to confirm the accuracy of its own model of 
the taxpayers’ postures. This is indeed an interesting feature of the model and it confirms 
MacKenzie’s point that models may at times express Barnesian performativity.   
 
When MacKenzie talks about Barnesian performativity being present as an economic 
model (the Black-Scholes model) alters what it refers to (the option-pricing) so that the 
prices start to change towards greater conformity to the model of the prices, the reader of 
his analysis gets surprised by this mechanism as one would expect the model only to 
represent the economic reality. As MacKenzie writes there is a certain nature of the model 
of aiming at representing economic processes (MacKenzie, 2006, p. 6). In a very 
important sense the segmentation model is a radically different empirical entity from the 
models that MacKenzie looks at. The nature of the segmentation model is that it both has 
an aim of representing the businesses (in the quantitative segments) and it prescribes 
treatments to shape the taxpayers in moving down the pyramid.  
 
What I want to highlight is thus the cleverness that the inventors of the model must have 
posited. They have invented a model that does not only express Barnesian performativity, 
but a model wherein the mechanism of Barnesian performativity is an inbuilt aim. The 
model explicitly shapes a reality that confirms the predictions of the model. In this way 
the nature of the model in focus here is different from MacKenzie’s one-sidedly 
representational model. Due to the nature of the segmentation model we cannot be too 
surprised by the fact that it actually expresses Barnesian performativity. However, we can 
be surprised at its barefaced aim to do so and its successes (or failures) in doing it.  
 
A twist to this Barnesian  characteristic of the model of moving the taxpayers down the 
pyramid is that the model apparently works best in economically good times. In a 
newspaper article the former CEO of SKAT explains that the treatment strategy was 
planned and implemented in the early-mid 2000s when Denmark was in a financial boom; 
the number of bankruptcies and debt-burdened taxpayers were the lowest on record. In 
2008, on the other hand, SKAT sees more and more arrears. The CEO explains: 
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We know from experience that in times of crisis there is a need for 
more inspection of the financial accounts. Simply because some 
businesses try to cope with the financial crisis by cutting down their 
taxes. The businesses become more speculative in time of crisis. (Olsen, 
2008)  
Thus, in economically bad times there is a need for more inspection and the businesses 
move up the pyramid. In times of crisis the assumption that most taxpayers are in the 
bottom white segment is made a more unstable fact as the businesses generally speculate 
more in their taxes and become less compliant. Hence, the assumption of the segmentation 
model that most taxpayers are in the bottom white segment is not seen by the tax 
administration to be universally true. Rather, it is a relative truth varying with the 
economic situation of the country.  
 
That the businesses’ practices conform less well to the model in economically bad times is 
also shown by SKAT’s own statistics. Beneath are the three most current segmentations of 
Danish businesses. In 2008 the percentage of businesses in the white bottom segment – 
just before the financial crisis began – was 53.3 per cent (SKAT, 2009a). Looking at the 
figures below we can see that in 2009 they declined to 47.3 per cent, in 2010 further down 
to 44.1 per cent. In 2011 when the financial crisis in Denmark was starting to decrease the 
number rises to 49 per cent. These figures speak in favor of the claim that in economically 
bad times the segmentation model have difficulties in making its own assumptions about 
most taxpayers being in bottom segment become truer.   
24 
 
 
 
Illustration V: Yearly segmentations from SKAT.  
Knowing that MacKenzie both talks about Barnesian Performativity and 
counterperformativity it is worth enquiring whether the fact that businesses move up the 
triangle in economically bad times can be characterized as an instance of 
counterperformativity. Recalling that counterperformativity implies that the practical use 
of a model alters the processes represented whereby these conform less well to the 
model’s depiction. Now, taking the statistics above at face value they do indeed indicate 
that the businesses in economically bad times conform less well to the model. However, 
based on this material I do not believe that one can judge whether this is due to the model 
expressing counterperformativity or whether it is simply due to the fact that the economy 
challenges the model. Hence, enquiring into the model’s (potential) counterperformativity 
would need more and perhaps different material than has been presented in this analysis.  
 
 
Fatal reality encounters 
 
Collecting the empirical material presented in this article I emailed SKAT to request 
whether I could receive the above displayed figures. I received the figures and a brief 
report analyzing them. Interestingly, however, the email accompanying the material 
announced that the figures had not really been read in SKAT. Nonetheless, the person 
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writing the email hoped that I was able to use the numbers (private email communication). 
I was puzzled over this statement; had the figures not been used? Why not use the figures 
as so much work had been invested in the implementation of the segmentation model and 
in doing the classifications? Reading the accompanying report provided an explanation. In 
short the report states that the criteria for segmenting the businesses had changed: whereas 
earlier a segmentation lasted three years, a segmentation now only applied for the present 
year. Also, a so-called manual segmentation where a tax inspector – based on a physical 
inspection – re-segments a business was also decided to last for a longer period of time. 
Finally, the criteria for being a large business was also starting to become assessed in a 
new way.  
 
In light of these adjustments in categories and in the criteria for segmenting businesses the 
report states that is it not possible to make comparisons. I gather that this is also why the 
report and the segments ‘have not been read in SKAT’. The situation provokes a smile. 
Here we are; having segmented businesses for a number of years and having accomplished 
the Compliance-project the comparisons of segmentations between years are questioned 
by SKAT. I interpret that the comparisons are questioned precisely because the 
representation (the model) and the reality (the businesses) are not stable entities. Not only 
are the businesses moving targets, i.e. they are changed as they interact with the model; 
also the criteria by which the model operates are changed as the model interacts with 
realty. This does of course also jeopardize my use of the yearly segmentations to argue 
that the segmentation model performs its own assumptions less well in economically bad 
times. This begs for reflection as to whether a rejection of data from the informants (here 
SKAT), also disqualifies the data as useful in my analytical optic. Here I would argue, that 
even though the data in an ‘objective’ sense are questioned by SKAT, this does not mean 
that the segmentations do not have performative effects: although the data is not ‘true’, it 
still has effects.       
 
My final comment on the life of the segmentation model might best be described as the 
model literally has been knockout by its encounters with reality; the model is threatened 
by a reality that can change the model and there is not really any way to meet that threat 
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for the model in its present configuration. The ‘game’ that the model has been capable of 
playing is first of all to freeze reality – take a picture – of the taxpayers’ motivational 
postures. The model has indeed succeeded with respect to picturing the taxpayers; we 
have seen the classifications. Furthermore, the model has been capable of shaping the 
businesses so they move down the pyramid and picture this movement (at least in 
economically good times). However, here the success of the model pauses; though being 
explicitly aware of its aim of shaping the taxpayers the model has been built on the 
assumption that it was itself stable. Its stability lays in its characteristic pyramid shape and 
it its specific assumptions about how the taxpayers are classified. The model only always 
presented its criteria for segmenting and for changing the businesses. Never did it present 
assumptions or criteria for its own change. This, I argue, is what knocks out the model. 
From SKAT’s experience of the ‘useless’ comparisons we learn that the segmentation 
model itself also changes, which is at odds with its own self-image. The segmentation 
model is thus being confronted with the fact that the model has assumed a world wherein 
everything around the model was in motion and could be shaped, whereas it believed itself 
to be stable. This has turned out not to be true and has resulted in neglect and 
abandonment of the model.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has investigated the relationship between the segmentation model, which was 
implemented in the Danish Tax and Customs Administration in 2005, and the businesses it 
seeks to represent and perform. With reference to Hacking and MacKenzie’s concepts of 
performativity I have analyzed the relationship between the two and shown how both the 
model and the businesses change as they interact. I have argued that the segmentation 
model on the one hand posits a remarkable cleverness in that it simultaneously alters what 
it represents and represents this altered reality to confirm the accuracy of its own model of 
the taxpayers’ motivational postures. On the other hand, however, the model has a blind 
spot as it assumes a world wherein everything around the model is in motion and can be 
shaped, whereas it believes itself to be stable. As indicated, this assumption has been fatal 
for the model as SKAT questions its ability to produce valid comparisons.  
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Using Hacking and MacKenzie’s concepts to analyze the model’s relationship to the 
businesses has allow me to sharpen the understanding of what the segmentation model 
does in relation to the businesses and to show how the businesses are made up in new 
ways as an effect of the use of the model. In addition to these case specific insights, I also 
believe that the analysis gently pushes particularly MacKenzie’s approach to studying 
performativity. First of all, the article uses a methodology which is slightly different from 
what he suggests as appropriate. The article’s analysis proves that the material used here 
(explorative interviews, official documents and scholarly literature) provides good insight 
into the relationship between the two and how they change. Secondly, the article shows 
that it is important to acknowledge the different natures of the models that MacKenzie and 
I, respectively, work with. There is a certain sense in which the analysis of models that 
explicitly both aspire to represent and to perform (such as the segmentation model) may 
necessarily differ from an analysis of models that only seek to represent (such as 
MacKenzie’s model). In this article I have started to develop such a different analytical 
approach by focusing on the cleverness as well as on the blind spot of the model. 
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